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NOTES AND COMMENTS
UCC 2-718(1): ATTORNEY'S FEES AS
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES IN NEW YORK
INTRODUCTION
"Liquidated damages constitute the compensation which, the
parties have agreed, must be paid in satisfaction of the loss or injury
which will follow from a breach of contract."' The stipulated
amount will be given legal effect, provided it is predicated upon the
doctrine of just compensation for the harm caused by the breach. 2
Where, however, the sum stipulated is unreasonably large,3 or is
designed to secure4 or coerce 5 a party's performance under the con-
tract, the provision will be deemed a penalty," and considered void.7
I Wirth & Hamid Fair Booking, Inc. v. Wirth, 265 N.Y. 214, 223, 192 N.E. 297, 301
(1934). For a discussion of liquidated damages, see 5 S. WILUSTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS
§ 776, at 668 (3d ed. W. Jaeger 1961) [hereinafter cited as WILLsrONJ; Brightman, Liqui-
dated Damages, 25 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1925) [hereinafter cited as Brightman]; McCormick,
Liquidated Damages, 17 VA. L. REv. 103 (1930) [hereinafter cited as McCormick].
See, e.g., Priebe & Sons v, United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947); Joy Vending Co. v.
S. & A. Luncheonette & Restaurant, Inc., 15 Misc. 2d 565,566, 180 N.Y.S.2d 194, 196 (N.Y.C.
Mun. Ct. Kings County 1958); Weatherproof Improvement Contracting Corp. v. Kramer, 12
Misc. 2d 100, 103, 172 N.Y.S.2d 688, 691 (N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. Bronx County 1956). Professor
Corbin notes that "justice requires nothing more than compensation measured by the amount
of the harm suffered." 5 A. CoRBIN, CONTR4CTS § 1057, at 334 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
CORBIN]. Professor Williston considers the primary question to be "whether the parties hon.
estly endeavored to fix a sum equivalent in value to the breach." 5 WILLISTON, supra note 1,
§ 779, at 697. See generally 1 T. SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAES § 406,
at 779 (9th ed. 1912) [hereinafter cited as SEDGWICK]; 1 J. SUTHERLAND, A TREATISE ON THE
LAw OF DAMAGES § 283, at 847-49 (4th ed. 1916).
'See, e.g.. Allen B. Du Mont Laboratories, Inc. v. Kane, 68 N.Y.S.2d 537, 538 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1946) (liquidated damages provision invalid if "plainly excessive"). See notes
58-60 and accompanying text infra.
I See, e.g., Jarro Bldg. Indus. Corp. v. Schwartz, 54 Misc. 2d 13, 281 N.Y.S.2d 420 (App.
T. 2d Dep't 1967) (liquidated damages provision which also gave aggrieved party the right to
sue for damages void as attempt to secure performance). See also Brightman, supra note 1.
at 277.
See Sweet, Liquidated Damages in California, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 84, 92 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Sweet].
I A penalty has been defined as
a sum named, which is disproportionate to the damage which could have been
anticipated from breach of the contract, and which is agreed upon in order to
enforco performance of the main puriose of the coptraqt by the compulsion of this
very disproportion. It is held in terrorem over the promisor to deter him from
breaking his promise.
5 WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 776, at 668 (footnote omitted). See generally Sweet, supra note
5, at 92. But see 5 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 1058, at 340, where the author contends that often
a valid liquidated damages provision is also utilized in an in terrorem capacity.
ATTORNEY'S FEES
The onus thus falls upon the judiciary to determine whether a stipu-
lation is an enforceable liquidated damages provision, or an unen-
forceable penalty. Over 100 years ago, Judge Miller of the New York
Court of Appeals was compelled to remark that this burden "is one
of considerable difficulty, and the authorities on the subject are
replete with contradictions. '8
In contrast to the uncertainty concerning the enforceability of
liquidated damages provisions, the question whether attorney's fees
are recoverable as an element of damages in a lawsuit has long been
settled in New York. Considered to be merely incidents of litiga-
tion,9 attorney's fees are not normally recoverable absent specific
statutory authority or contractual agreement.10
In Equitable Lumber Corp. v. IPA Land Development Corp.,"
the New York Court of Appeals, departing significantly from prior
interpretation, 2 characterized a contractual agreement to pay attor-
ney's fees as a stipulation for liquidated damages. This Note will
examine the court's decision and attempt to discern its import.
EQUITABLE LUMBER CORP. V. IPA LAND DEVELOPMENT CORP.
The Equitable Lumber defendant, a builder and developer,
entered into an agreement to purchase a quantity of lumber and
building supplies from the plaintiff, a lumber company. One of the
clauses 3 in the contract, provided:
I See 2 W. PAGE, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1170, at 1796 (1905) [hereinafter cited as
PAGE]; 5 WILuSTON, supra note 1, § 776, at 669; note 68 and accompanying text infra.
Colwell v. Lawrence, 38 N.Y. 71, 74 (1868). Subsequently, other courts have similarly
acknowledged the difficulties encountered by the judiciary in construing liquidated damages
stipulations. See, e.g., Kemp v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 69 N.Y. 45, 57 (1877); Realworth
Properties, Inc. v. Bachler, 33 Misc. 2d 39, 45, 223 N.Y.S.2d 910, 916 (Sup. Ct. Monroe
County 1962). See also Prentice, Liquidated Damages in Illinois, 31 ILL. L. REV. 879 (1937)
[hereinafter cited as Prentice]; Note, Liquidated Damages in Illinois Contracts, 45 CHi.-
KENT L. REv. 183 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Liquidated Damages in Illinois Contracts].
See Klein v. Sharp, 41 App. Div. 2d 926, 343 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (1st Dep't 1973) (mem.).
" See, e.g., Piaget Watch Corp. v. Audemars Piguet & Co., 35 App. Div. 2d 920, 316
N.Y.S.2d 104 (lst Dep't 1970) (mem.); Shindler v. Lamb, 25 Misc. 2d 810, 211 N.Y.S.2d 762
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1959), affd mem., 10 App. Div. 2d 826, 200 N.Y.S.2d 346 (1st Dep't
1960), aff'd mem., 9 N.Y.2d 621, 172 N.E.2d 79, 210 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1961).
1 38 N.Y.2d 516, 344 N.E.2d 391, 381 N.Y.S.2d 459 (1976), rev'g 45 App. Div. 2d 1003,
358 N.Y.S.2d 672 (2d Dep't 1974) (mem.).
12 See notes 127-29 and accompanying text infra.
13 Directly above the space reserved for the signatures of the parties, the agreement,
prepared by the plaintiff, conspicuously stated: "THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS SET
FORTH ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF ARE EXPRESSLY MADE A PART OF THIS
AGREEMENT." 38 N.Y.2d at 518 n.2, 344 N.E.2d at 393 n.2, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 461 n.2. The
contract was executed by the presidents of the respective corporations. Brief for Appellant
at 3, A-20.
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If the Buyer breaches this contract and the enforcement thereof,
or any provision thereof, or the collection of any monies due
thereunder is turned over to an attorney, the Buyer herein agrees
to pay, in addition to all of Seller's expenses, a reasonable counsel
fee; and in the event the matter turned over is the collection of
monies, such reasonable counsel fee is hereby agreed to be thirty
(30%) per cent. The guarantor shall also be liable for such counsel
fee and expenses. 4
The plaintiff thereafter delivered the materials specified in the
contract, but the defendant refused to pay for them. 5 The plaintiff
then instituted suit for recovery of the purchase price of the mater-
ials supplied, together with the attorney's fees provided for in the
contract. 6
Upon plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the Supreme
Court, Kings County, awarded the plaintiff $3936.42, representing
the balance due on the materials delivered. Additionally, the court
determined that the defendant was liable for the plaintiff's attor-
ney's fees, but refused to enforce the thirty percent provision of the
contract. 7 Instead, the court conducted a hearing to ascertain the
nature and extent of the services rendered by the plaintiff's attor-
ney'8 and determined that no more than 10 hours were necessary for
the attorney to handle the matter adequately, and fixed attorney's
fees at $450."' On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Depart-
ment modified the award in a brief memorandum opinion, increas-
ing the attorney's fees to $750.20 Seeking to have the thirty percent
stipulation strictly enforced, the plaintiff appealed the decision to
the court of appeals.
Writing for a unanimous court, Judge Gabrielli reversed the
order of the appellate division, concluding that the approach em-
ployed by the supreme court in construing the provision for attor-
38 N.Y.2d at 519, 344 N.E.2d at 393, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 461 (emphasis in original).
The defendant corporation had become insolvent and had vacated its office. Id.
The complaint filed by the plaintiff demanded judgment for $3,936.42, the price of
materials supplied, together with $1,180.93 for attorney's fees, equivalent to 30% of the
contract price. Brief for Appellant at 4-5. The defendant answered by disclaiming liability,
alleging that the goods delivered were not merchantable. 38 N.Y.2d at 519, 344 N.E.2d at
394, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 461.
11 Justice Multer, in an unreported memorandum decision, characterized the plaintiff's
demand for attorney's fees of 30% as "extortionate, exorbitant, and unreasonable." Brief for
Appellant at A-34.
" See note 160 infra, wherein the services rendered by the plaintiff's attorney are enu-
merated.
" 38 N.Y.2d at 519, 344 N.E.2d at 394, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 462.
45 App. Div. 2d at 1003, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 672.
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ney's fees was incorrect. The court determined that the stipulation
was an agreement for liquidated damages, and analyzed it under
section 2-718(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),21 the pro-
vision applicable to liquidated damages in transactions involving
the sale of goods. To understand fully the court's decision, however,
it is necessary initially to independently examine the law concerning
liquidated damages stipulations and the law concerning attorney's
fees provisions in New York.
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES
At early common law, "penal bonds" were commonly exacted
to secure the performance of obligations.2 A sum of money, often
in excess of the value of the principal obligation, was stipulated to
be paid by the debtor in the event of default. If the obligation was
faithfully performed, the promise to pay this penal sum was consid-
ered void.24 In an action upon the bond, the common law courts
would enforce, as a matter of course, the penalty in addition to the
principal obligation.25 Equity soon intervened, however, and pre-
vented recovery of any sum in excess of the principal obligation.2 1
21 N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (McKinney 1964) states:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only
at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated or actual harm
caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or
nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreason-
ably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.
2 Penal bond obligations are derived from the poenae stipulatio, the conventional pen-
alty of ancient Roman law which allowed the recovery of a penal sum upon default in the
performance of an obligation. The poena was strictly enforced, even if it exceeded the value
of the principal obligation. Depending upon the circumstances, the penalty was considered
to operate either as indemnification for the harm occasioned by the breach, or as a substitute
for the damages suffered by the promisee. See Loyd, Penalties and Forfeitures, 29 HARv. L.
REv. 117 (1915) [hereinafter cited as Loyd]; Comment, Penal Clauses and Liquidated Dam-
ages, A Comparative Study, 33 TUL. L. REv. 180, 181 (1958) [hereinafter cited as
Comparative Study].
21 See 5 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 1056, at 321; McCormick, supra note 1, at 104-05.
Although the primary purpose of the stipulated sum may have been to punish breach or
coerce performance, it was not thereby rendered unenforceable. 2 PAGE, supra note 7, § 1169,
at 1795.
21 McCormick, supra note 1, at 104-05.
2" See Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n v. Moore, 183 U.S. 642, 660 (1902); Watts v.
Camors, 115 U.S. 353, 360 (1885). The penalty was strictly enforced according to its terms. 2
PAGE, supra note 7, § 1169, at 1794-95; Comparative Study, supra note 22, at 184.
" See Watts v. Camors, 115 U.S. 353, 360-61 (1885). One authority has declared: "Equity
.. . looked at the intent and not the outward form or the contract, and relieved against
penalties and forfeitures." 2 PAGE, supra note 7, § 1169, at 1795 (footnote omitted). Equity's
prohibition against penalties extended beyond the disallowance of penal sums in bonds. For
example, the forfeiture of land conveyed in a mortgage upon default by the mortgagor was
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Subsequently, the same result was mandated in law by statutes that
limited a plaintiff's recovery to the actual damages suffered from
the breach of the obligation." These principles, evolved in actions
upon bonds, subsequently were extended to all contracts. 8
Although the courts had determined not to enforce penalty pro-
visions, contractual agreements to liquidate damages soon became
judicially acceptable, for "it came to be recognized that promises
to pay money as recompense for future defaults which could not be
exactly valued, were legitimate expedients for avoiding the uncer-
tainty of a jury's finding and should be enforced. '29
In evaluating a liquidated damages provision, the common law
courts generally focused upon three principal areas of inquiry: First,
the intention of the parties; 30 second, the difficulty of ascertaining
damages upon breach; 31 and third, the reasonableness of the amount
stipulated .32
The Intention of the Parties Requirement
In Cotheal v. Talmage,33 the court of appeals expressed the
subsequently oft-stated rule34 that "courts are to be governed by
also forbidden. 1 SEDGWICK, supra note 2, § 390, at 758; McCormick, supra note 1, at 105.
27 See 8 & 9 Wm. 3, c. 11, § 8 (1697); 4 Anne, c. 16, §§ 12-13 (1705), discussed in Loyd,
supra note 22, at 126. In essence, such statutes provided that "the plaintiff in actions upon
penal bonds should state the breaches of the condition, and, although entitled to judgment
for the amount of the penalty, should be limited in his recovery to the damages proved, the
judgment merely remaining as security for further breaches." Id. at 126. These concepts have
subsequently been incorporated into our modem law. 5 WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 775A, at
658. Today, "the rule is universal that the measure of damages upon a bond with penalty is
the plaintiff's actual damage from the breach of condition." McCormick, supra note 1, at 106.
See generally 2 PAGE, supra note 7, § 1169, at 1795-96; 1 SEDGWICK, supra note 2, § 390, at
758.
2, See 5 WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 776, at 667; Comparative Study, supra note 22, at
185.
2, McCormick, supra note 1, at 106 (footnote omitted). The use of liquidated damages
also avoids the necessity of proving damages at trial. See Jarro Bldg. Indus. Corp. v.
Schwartz, 54 Misc. 2d 13, 281 N.Y.S.2d 420 (App. T. 2d Dep't 1967). See also Callanan Rd.
Improvement Co. v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 190 Misc. 418, 72 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Sup. Ct.
Albany County 1947) (liquidated damages avoid the cost and inconvenience of future investi-
gation). For further discussion of the rationale for permitting liquidated damages, see note
164 and accompanying text infra.
27 See notes 33-43 and accompanying text infra.
2 See notes 44-57 and accompanying text infra.
22 See notes 58-69 and accompanying text infra.
- 9 N.Y. 551 (1854).
3 See, e.g., Caesar v. Rubinson, 174 N.Y. 492, 496, 167 N.E. 58, 59 (1903); Little v.
Banks, 85 N.Y. 258, 266 (1881); Colwell v. Lawrence, 38 N.Y. 71, 75 (1868); J. Weinstein &
Sons v. City of New York, 264 App. Div. 398, 35 N.Y.S.2d 530 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 289
N.Y. 741, 46 N.E.2d 351 (1942).
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[the] intention of the parties, to be gathered from the language of
the contract and from the nature and circumstances of the case,"
in determining whether a provision is an enforceable liquidated
damages stipulation or an unenforceable penalty.38 If the court finds
that the parties intended the sum to operate as liquidated damages,
the provision must be enforced, for "the courts are not authorized
. . .to make a new contract for the parties, or unmake the one made
by them . . . 31
Although some courts have held that the language used in the
contract is determinative of the provision's characterization, 3 most
9 N.Y. at 554.
The intention of the parties test has been considered by some courts to be "the funda-
mental rule" in construing a stipulation for liquidated damages. See, e.g., Kemp v. Knicker-
bocker Ice Co., 69 N.Y. 45, 58 (1877). But see notes 41-43 and accompanying text infra.
37 Clement v. Cash, 21 N.Y. 253, 256 (1860). In an early leading case, Dakin v. Williams,
17 Wend. 447 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. of Jud. 1837), afl'd, 22 Wend. 447, aff'd, 22 Wend. 201 (N.Y.
Ct. of Errors 1839), the plaintiffs agreed to purchase the defendant's newspaper plant and
subscription list for $3500. As additional consideration, the parties covenanted that the defen-
dant would pay $3000 to the plaintiffs as liquidated damages if the defendant should ever
venture into the newspaper industry again or give assistance to a competing paper. Upon
breach of the agreement, the plaintiffs sued for the stipulated amount. In holding that
payment of the sum was enforceable, the court remarked that
the business of the court . . . is to inquire after the meaning and intent of the
parties; and when that is clearly ascertained from the terms and language used, it
must be carried into effect. . . .If [the parties] are competent to contract within
the prudential rules the law has fixed as to parties, and there has been no fraud,
circumvention or illegality in the case, the court is bound to enforce the agreement.
17 Wend. at 454.
Other courts have similarly acknowledged a "duty" to enforce a liquidated damages
provision once the intention of the parties has been affirmatively ascertained. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105, 119 (1907); Sun Printing & Publishing
Ass'n v. Moore, 183 U.S. 642, 662 (1902). Once the court has determined that the stipulation
was intended to operate as liquidated damages, the sum must be enforced, for a court cannot
refuse to enforce a stipulation merely because it might feel that one of the parties entered
into a poor bargain. See, e.g., Couch v. Newtown Council Bldg. Ass'n, 109 App. Div. 856, 96
N.Y.S. 441 (2d Dep't 1905). When the intention of the parties is in doubt, however, the
tendency of the courts "is to favor the construction which makes the sum payable for breach
of contract a penalty rather than liquidated damages. . . ." City of New York v. Brooklyn
& Manhattan Ferry Co., 238 N.Y. 52, 56, 143 N.E. 788, 790 (1924). Accord, Associated Gen.
Contractors, Inc. v. Savin Bros., 45 App. Div. 2d 136, 356 N.Y.S.2d 374 (3d Dep't 1974), aff'd
per curiam, 36 N.Y.2d 957, 335 N.E.2d 859, 373 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1975); J. Weinstein & Sons v.
City of New York, 264 App. Div. 398, 35 N.Y.S.2d 530 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 289 N.Y. 741,
46 N.E.2d 351 (1942). See generally 2 PAGE, supra note 7, § 1173, at 1800.
I See, e.g., Clement v. Cash, 21 N.Y. 253, 256-57 (1860). In Callanan Rd. Improvement
Co. v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 190 Misc. 418, 72 N.Y.S.2d 194 (Sup. Ct. Albany County
1947), the plaintiff, a manufacturer of crushed stone, sued the defendant buyer for breach of
contract. The parties had agreed that the defendant would pay a specified amount, expressly
labeled as liquidated damages, in the event that the defendant should breach the agreement
by taking less than the minimum quantity of stone stated in the contract. In holding that
the stipulated damages were recoverable by the plaintiff, the court seized upon the language
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courts construing a stipulation have declined to be constrained by
the parties' choice of terminology.39 As a result, it appears that what
the parties "intended" often depends ultimately upon the construc-
tion given to the provision by the court: If the court decides to
enforce the stipulation, the parties are said to have "intended" the
clause to be a liquidated damages provision; if the court refuses to
enforce it, the parties are therefore said to have "intended" a pen-
alty.4 Consequently, the intention of the parties test has been se-
verely criticized, '1 being characterized as both irrelevant 42 and not
controlling."
employed by the parties in the contract, stating:
Sometimes there has been difficulty in ascertaining intent, but the case at bar is
quite explicit in the use of words, at least, that liquidated damage and not forfeiture
or penalty were what the parties here had in mind, and Judge Pound was of [thel
opinion that explicit statement in this direction was one of the criteria of a valid
provision.
Id. at 421, 72 N.Y.S.2d at 197, citing City of New York v. Brooklyn & Manhattan Ferry Co.,
238 N.Y. 52, 57, 143 N.E. 788, 790 (1924). Similarly, some courts have held that use of the
words "penalty" or "forfeiture" is conclusive against the provision being construed as a
stipulation for liquidated damages. See, e.g., Colwell v. Lawrence, 38 N.Y. 71 (1868). See
generally Liquidated Damages in Illinois Contracts, supra note 8, at 187.
11 Professor Corbin notes that the characterization chosen by the parties normally has
little influence upon the court's construction of the provision. 5 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 1058,
at 337. See United States v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 205 U.S. 105, 115 (1907); Mosler Safe Co.
v. Maiden Lane Safe Deposit Co., 199 N.Y. 479, 485, 93 N.E. 81, 83 (1910); Caesar v.
Rubinson, 174 N.Y. 492, 496, 167 N.E. 58, 59 (1903); Realworth Properties, Inc. v. Bachler,
33 Misc. 2d 39, 45, 223 N.Y.S.2d 910, 916 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1962).
1° In construing the intention of the parties, "[t]he intent involved ... is 'legal intent,'
which may be entirely different from the actual intention present in the minds of the contract-
ing parties." Anderson, Liquidated Damage Problems in Construction Contracts. 5 PRAc.
LAW., Feb. 1959, at 73 [hereinafter cited as Anderson]. See also Arndt, Liquidated Damages
in California, 10 CALIF. L. REV. 8, 13 (1921), where the author notes that the parties' actual
intention may be different from the court's construction of their intention.
In Little v. Banks, 85 N.Y. 258 (1881), for example, it was only after holding the liqui-
dated damages stipulation to be enforceable, that the court declared that the parties had
intended the sum to operate as liquidated damages and not as a penalty.
" Professor Williston maintains: "'Intention of the parties' is . . . a misleading and
undesirable designation . . . , and the first step towards clearing the confusion of the law on
the subject [of liquidated damages] is to drop the use of the phrase from the discussion." 5
WILISTON, supra note 1, § 778, at 693 (footnote omitted).
11 See Dunbar, Drafting the Liquidated Damage Clause-When and How, 20 OHIo ST.
L.J. 221 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Dunbar], where the author observes:
Rarely is there any doubt about what the parties intended. If the agreement is to
the effect that if A fails to perform as promised he shall pay Y dollars to B, that is
what they meant. What is there to construe?
The true rule surely is that the intention of the parties . is irrelevant; that
the law, as a matter of public policy, imposes a limitation upon the freedom of the
power to contract, and that if a contractual provision is not within the limitation
it is invalid.
Id. at 225 (footnote omitted).
13 See, e.g., Jacob Glass, Inc. v. Banca Marmorosch, 122 Misc. 637, 639, 204 N.Y.S. 636,
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The Difficulty of Ascertainment Requirement
Perhaps the critical test in determining the validity of a
liquidated damages provision is whether the damages would be dif-
ficult or incapable of ascertainment upon breach.44 In Ward v. Hud-
son River Building Co.,45 an early leading case, the plaintiff, a con-
tractor, agreed to erect certain houses for the defendant. The agree-
ment provided for the sum of $10 per day to be assessed against the
contractor in the event he delayed completing the structures. Hold-
ing that the contractual term was an enforceable liquidated dam-
ages provision, the New York Court of Appeals stated the following
rule:
If it shall . . . appear that the damage and loss, which may be
presumed to result from nonperformance, are uncertain and inca-
pable of exact ascertainment, then the payment or liability fixed
by [the parties] must be deemed to be liquidated damages and
recoverable as such.4 6
The rationale for this rule was illuminated in the subsequent
case of Curtis v. Van Bergh,47 which involved an agreement to erect
and lease a building. In Curtis, the parties had agreed upon liqui-
dated damages of $50 per day should the plaintiff fail to complete
the structure on time. Subsequently, when occupancy was post-
poned because of the builder's delays, the lessee sought to imple-
ment the liquidated damages provision. 48 In reversing a judgment
for the builder, the court of appeals stated: "We thus reach the
ultimate question, whether the damages within the contemplation
of the parties when they made the contract in question, are so uncer-
tain as to be difficult of ascertainment . . . 41
637 (N.Y.C. City Ct. 1924); Prentice, supra note 8, at 879. But see Liquidated Damages in
Illinois Contracts, supra note 8, at 186 (intention of the parties considered a controlling
factor); Comment, A Functional Approach in Determining the Validity of a Liquidated-
Damages Clause, 30 TEx. L. REv. 752, 760 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Functional Approach I
(intention of the parties test will continue to be used by the courts as a tool). Some commen-
tators contend that the ultimate factor in construing the intention of the parties is whether
there is a reasonable relationship between the sum stipulated and the damages to be antici-
pated upon breach. See 5 CoRBIN, supra note 2, § 1058, at 340; McCormick, supra note 1, at
111-12; Prentice, supra note 8, at 881.
" See Sweet, supra note 5, at 131. But see Prentice, supra note 8, at 885, where the author
suggests that the ascertainment test should be abandoned.
' 125 N.Y. 230, 26 N.E. 256 (1891).
" Id. at 235, 26 N.E. at 257 (emphasis added).
" 161 N.Y. 47, 55 N.E. 398 (1899).
The plaintiff contended that since the rental to be paid by the defendant upon occu-
pancy was only $5.75 per day, the $50 per day liquidated damages provision was therefore
unconscionable and void as a penalty. Id. at 52, 55 N.E. at 400.
9 Id.
19761
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The court answered this decisive question in the affirmative,
noting the particular circumstances which had rendered the dam-
ages difficult to ascertain: the lessee's manufacturing business
would have been appreciably disrupted if the building was not
promptly completed; its fall and winter goods could not have been
manufactured; and it would have had to either hold over in its prior
location and face possible eviction or suffer the trouble and expense
of moving twice if it could secure another building. Since these
elements of damage were wholly conjectural at the time the contract
was negotiated,5 and were incapable of accurate assessment upon
breach, the liquidated damages provision was sustained.5
Certain courts and commentators appear to have employed a
different test in lieu of the difficulty of ascertainment test, asking
instead whether the damages incident to a breach are "incapable of
See note 61 and accompanying text infra.
An examination of some of the leading cases reveals the importance ascribed to the
ascertainment test when evaluating a stipulation for lquidated damages. Thus, in Edelstein
v. Spielberger, 197 App. Div. 262, 188 N.Y.S. 723 (1st Dep't 1921), the defendant agreed to
purchase shares of stock from the plaintiff for $10,750 to be paid in installments. The contract
provided that if the defendant defaulted on any payments, the plaintiff could retain the
monies already paid, in addition to the stock, as liquidated damages. After payments were
made totalling $5000, the defendant defaulted. The plaintiff sued for the balance of payments
yet outstanding, $5750. The defendant alleged that the plaintiff's recovery was limited by the
agreement to any amounts already paid. In affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, Judge Page
answered the defendant's allegation:
It is true that the agreement so provides, but the parties to a contract can only
provide for the liquidation of damages in case the damages are uncertain, specula-
tive or difficult of computation, and where the contract calls for the sale of personal
property, payment to be made in installments, and certain installments are paid
on account, and the defendant defaults on subsequent payments, the damages are
certain and liquidated by law. It is not necessary or proper for the parties to provide
for the forfeiture of the amount already paid as liquidated damages. The damages
in this case are certain and capable of exact computation and are not speculative.
Id. at 264, 188 N.Y.S. at 724-25 (emphasis added).
Similarly, in Caesar v. Rubinson, 174 N.Y. 492, 67 N.E. 58 (1903), the court, in holding
a stipulated amount to be a penalty, stated:
There is no inherent difficulty in measuring the legal damages which the landlord
sustained in a case where the tenant omits to pay the rent, and is for that reason
dispossessed. . . .This is, therefore, a case where the damages sustained by reason
of the breach of the lease . . . could have been easily ascertained ....
Id. at 497, 67 N.E. at 60. See also Mosler Safe Co. v. Maiden Lane Safe Deposit Co., 199
N.Y. 479, 93 N.E. 81 (1910); Dunn v. Morgenthau, 73 App. Div. 147, 76 N.Y.S. 827 (1st Dep't
1902), aff'd mem., 175 N.Y. 518, 67 N.E. 1081 (1903); Jacob Glass, Inc. v. Banca Marmorosch,
122 Misc. 637, 204 N.Y.S. 636 (N.Y.C. City Ct. 1924); 1 SEDGWICK, supra note 2, § 393, at
760.
The Supreme Court has also endorsed the ascertainment test. See Priebe & Sons v.
United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947) (Douglas, J.). But see 2 PAGE, supra note 7, § 1175,
at 1803. For discussion of the ascertainment test, see generally 1 SEDOWIcK, supra note 2, §
393, at 760; Anderson, supra note 40, at 73; Functional Approach, supra note 43, at 761-62.
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estimation."5 Under this test, "it is necessary that at the time the
contract is made it must appear that the injury that will be caused
by the breach will be difficult of estimation. '5 3 It is submitted that
there is a crucial distinction between these two tests. Under the
estimation test, it appears that only the prospective uncertainty of
damages is considered.54 Under the ascertainment test, however, the
damages, in addition to being conjectural, must be such that a court
could not easily determine them upon breach. 5 The New York
courts, with but one exception,56 have clearly adopted the difficulty
of ascertainment test.57
" See, e.g., Joint Indus. Bd. v. Kaplan, 66 Misc. 2d 427, 320 N.Y.S.2d 452 (N.Y.C. Civ.
Ct. N.Y. County 1971); Dunbar, supra note 42, at 223-25; Macneil, Power of Contract and
Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 495, 501-03 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Macneill.
- 5 CORBIN, supra note 2, § 1060, at 350 (footnote omitted). See generally Macneil, supra
note 52, at 502.
" The estimation test has been variously construed, sometimes even being used inter-
changeably with the ascertainment test. See Macneil, supra note 52, at 502.
There is a divergence of opinion concerning the proper vantage point for applying the
ascertainment test. In Better Food Markets, Inc. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 179,
253 P.2d 10 (1953), the court, in construing a California statute which codifies the ascertain-
ment test, held that this test is to be applied as of the time when the contract was entered
into, and not as of the time of its breach. For a discussion of the opinion, see Smith,
Contractual Controls of Damages in Commercial Transactions, 12 HASTINGs L.J. 122, 123
(1960). Professor Sweet has criticized this decision, because actual damages could have been
determined at trial without significant difficulty. He suggests that the difficulty of ascertain-
ing damages be judged as of the time of the trial, thus avoiding the "potential unjust enrich-
ment and the seeming injustice of enforcing a clause when actual damages are much different
from the liquidated sum." Sweet, supra note 5, at 131-33.
The New York courts appear to follow Professor Sweet's suggestion, for although a liqui-
dated damages provision is interpreted in New York as of the date when the contract was
negotiated, and not as of its breach, see note 61 and accompanying text infra, the courts will
still inquire into the situation at the time of breach. See, e.g., Seidlitz v. Auerbach, 230 N.Y.
167, 129 N.E. 461 (1920). But see Anderson, supra note 40, at 73.
"' See Joint Indus. Bd. v. Kaplan, 66 Misc. 2d 427, 430, 320 N.Y.S.2d 452, 454-55 (N.Y.C.
Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1971), wherein the court employed the estimation test in evaluating a
stipulation for liquidated damages.
" See, e.g., City of Rye v. Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 34 N.Y.2d 470, 315 N.E.2d 458,
358 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1974); Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Savin Bros., 45 App. Div. 2d
136, 356 N.Y.S.2d 374 (3d Dep't 1974), aff'd per curiam, 36 N.Y.2d 957, 335 N.E.2d 859, 373
N.Y.S.2d 555 (1975); King Midas Mill Co. v. Montauk Wholesale Grocery Co., 243 App. Div.
173, 276 N.Y.S. 357 (2d Dep't 1935); Big Top Stores, Inc. v. Ardsley Toy Shoppe, Ltd., 64
Misc. 2d 894, 315 N.Y.S.2d 897 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1970), aff'd mem., 36 App. Div.
2d 582, 318 N.Y.S.2d 924 (2d Dep't 1971); Allen B. Du Mont Laboratories, Inc. v. Kane, 68
N.Y.S.2d 537 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1946).
The ascertainment test has also been adopted in many other states. See, e.g.. Peerless
Enterprises, Inc. v. T.N.T., Inc., 511 P.2d 538 (Colo. App. 1973); Norwalk Door Closer Co. v.
Eagle Lock & Screw Co., 153 Conn. 681, 220 A.2d 263 (1966); Carol Management Co. v.
Baring Indus., 257 So. 2d 270 (Fla. App. 1972).
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The Reasonable Stipulation Requirement
Even if the damages are incapable of ascertainment, for a liqui-
dated damages provision to be enforceable the sum stipulated by
the parties must also be reasonable in amount.58 It must be "a
genuine pre-estimate by the parties of the extent of injury that will
be caused by a future breach of the contract,"59 and must not be a
sum "grossly disproportionate to the anticipated probable harm
"60
The general method utilized to determine the validity of a
liquidated damages clause is to examine the provision as of the date
of the contract, rather than as of its breach.' Thus, most courts
have assessed the reasonableness of the amount stipulated in rela-
" As early as 1860, the New York Court of Appeals observed:
When. . . the damages resulting from the breach are uncertain in amount. . . the
parties have the right to say how much shall be paid by way of compensation to
the party injured; and when they have settled that compensation, neither a court
of law nor a court of equity will diminish its amount, unless it be so grossly dispro-
portionate to the actual injury that a man would start at the bare mention of it.
Clement v. Cash, 21 N.Y. 253, 256 (1860) (emphasis added). See also Norris v. McMechen,
135 Misc. 361, 364, 238 N.Y.S. 181, 186 (Sup. Ct. Warren County 1930) (stipulated sum is
enforceable unless it is so extreme that it shocks "the moral sense"). The reasonableness
requirement has been unanimously endorsed by the commentators. See, e.g., 5 WILLISTON,
supra note 1, § 779, at 695-99; Anderson, supra note 40, at 73; Liquidated Damages in Illinois
Contracts, supra note 8, at 187-88.
11 5 CORIN, supra note 2, § 1059, at 345. See, e.g., Realworth Properties, Inc. v. Bachler,
33 Misc. 2d 39, 223 N.Y.S.2d 910 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1962). See generally Dunbar,
supra note 42, at 223.
10 City of Rye v. Public Serv. Mut. Ins. Co., 34 N.Y.2d 470, 473, 315 N.E.2d 458, 459,
358 N.Y.S.2d 391, 393 (1974). Accord, Walter E. Heller & Co. v. American Flyers Airline
Corp., 459 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1972); Seidlitz v. Auerbach, 230 N.Y. 167, 129 N.E. 461 (1920);
Callanan Rd. Improvement Co. v. Colonial Sand & Stone Co., 190 Misc. 418, 72 N.Y.S.2d
194 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1947). The United States Supreme Court has also endorsed the
reasonableness test. See Kothe v. R.C. Taylor Trust, 280 U.S. 224, 226 (1930); Wise v. United
States, 249 U.S. 361 (1919).
Some courts have held that the burden of proving a stipulated sum to be so unreasonably
large as to constitute a penalty is on the party seeking to repudiate the contract. See, e.g.,
Knoblauch v. Little Falls Dairy Co., 241 App. Div. 910, 272 N.Y.S. 31 (4th Dep't 1934)
(mem.); Perma-Stone Bi-County Corp. v. Ackerman, 15 Misc. 2d 640, 182 N.Y.S. 655 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County), affd mem., 8 App. Div. 2d 731, 187 N.Y.S.2d 991 (2d Dep't 1959).
" Walter E. Heller & Co. v. American Flyers Airline Corp., 459 F.2d 896, 898 (2d Cir.
1972). Accord, Priebe & Sons v. United States, 332 U.S. 407 (1947); Seidlitz v. Auerbach,
230 N.Y. 167, 129 N.E. 461 (1920); Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Savin Bros., 45 App.
Div. 2d 136, 356 N.Y.S.2d 374 (3d Dep't 1974), aff'd per curiam, 36 N.Y.2d 957, 335 N.E.2d
859, 373 N.Y.S.2d 555 (1975); Konner Rental Corp. v. Pedone, 50 Misc. 2d 69, 269 N.Y.S.2d
463 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1966); Realworth Properties, Inc. v. Bachler, 33 Misc. 2d 39,
223 N.Y.S.2d 910 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1962). See generally Dunbar, supra note 42, at
223; McCormick, supra note 1, at 111; Liquidated Damages in Illinois Contracts, supra note
8, at 187.
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tion to the anticipated probable damages. 2 Some courts, however,
have inquired into the relationship between the amount stipulated
and the actual damages suffered upon breach.6 3 A few courts have
deemed it appropriate to consider both probable and actual dam-
ages."
The judicial uncertainty in this area was exemplified in the
recent case of City of Rye v. Public Service Mutual Insurance Co.,15
in which the plaintiff city instituted an action to recover a $100,000
bond given by the defendant as security for the timely construction
of six buildings. The agreement between the parties provided for
liquidated damages of $200 per day for each day completion was
overdue. Subsequently, the defendant delayed completion for more
than 500 days. In affirming the appellate division's denial of plain-
tiff's motion for summary judgment, the court of appeals initially
stated the rule that "a provision fixing the damages in advance will
be upheld if the amount is a reasonable measure of the anticipated
probable harm."6" Yet, in a later portion of the opinion, the court
12 See, e.g., Wise v. United States, 249 U.S. 361 (1919); Curtis v. Van Bergh, 161 N.Y.
47, 53, 55 N.E. 398, 400 (1899); Big Top Stores, Inc. v. Ardsley Toy Shoppe, Ltd., 64 Misc.
2d 894, 900, 315 N.Y.S.2d 897, 904 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1970), aff'd mem., 36 App.
Div. 2d 582, 318 N.Y.S.2d 924 (2d Dep't 1971); Kelly v. Board of Educ., 8 Misc. 2d 1007, 1009,
169 N.Y.S.2d 405, 406 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1957), aff'd mem., 7 App. Div. 2d 856, 182
N.Y.S.2d 343 (2d Dep't 1959), aff'd mem., 8 N.Y.2d 764, 168 N.E.2d 113, 201 N.Y.S.2d 779
(1960). See generally, McCormick, supra note 1, at 111; Macneil, supra note 52, at 503;
Liquidated Damages in Illinois Contracts, supra note 8, at 187.
13 See, e.g., Wirth & Hamid Fair Booking, Inc. v. Wirth, 265 N.Y. 214, 223, 192 N.E.
297, 301 (1934); Parker v. Dairymen's League Co-operative Ass'n, 222 App. Div. 341, 345-46,
226 N.Y.S. 226, 231 (4th Dep't 1927); Downtown Harv. Lunch Club v. Rasco, Inc., 201 Misc.
1087, 1090-91, 107 N.Y.S.2d 918, 922 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1951); Norris v. McMechen, 135
Misc. 361, 364, 238 N.Y.S. 181, 186 (Sup. Ct. Warren County 1930); Community Home
Improvement Co. v. Turner, 80 N.Y.S.2d 629, 631 (Syracuse Mun. Ct. 1947). See generally
PAGE, supra note 7, § 1176, at 1804. But see Walter E. Heller & Co. v. American Flyers Airline
Corp., 459 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1972), in which the Second Circuit stated that actual damages
are irrelevant under New York law.
" In Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Savin Bros., 45 App. Div. 2d 136, 356 N.Y.S.2d
374 (3d Dep't 1974), aff'd per curiam, 36 N.Y.2d 957, 335 N.E.2d 859, 373 N.Y.S.2d 555
(1975), the court stated:
It has long been the rule in this State that if the damage presumed to result from
nonperformance of a contract is uncertain and incapable of exact ascertainment,
the sum fixed by the parties is deemed to be liquidated damages and is recoverable
as such, unless the sum stipulated to be paid by the defaulting party is, when
interpreted as of the date of the agreement, grossly disproportionate to the presum-
able or probable damage, or to the readily ascertainable loss.
45 App. Div. 2d at 139, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 378 (emphasis added). Accord, Realworth Properties,
Inc. v. Bachler, 33 Misc. 2d 39, 223 N.Y.S.2d 910 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1962). See
generally Macneil, supra note 52, at 503-06; Functional Approach, supra note 43, at 763.
34 N.Y.2d 470, 315 N.E.2d 458, 358 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1974).
6' Id. at 473, 315 N.E.2d at 459, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 393 (emphasis added).
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also stated that "[tihere is nothing to show that either the sum of
$200 per day or the aggregate amount of the bond bear any reason-
able relationship to the pecuniary harm likely to be suffered or in
fact suffered."67
Should the court ultimately hold a stipulation to be a penalty,
actual damages do become vitally important. In such a case, the
rule is firmly established that the stipulation is considered void, 8
and the party seeking to enforce the provision may nonetheless re-
cover such actual damages as he can prove."
In sum, the common law requirements essential for a valid
liquidated damages provision are that the stipulated sum must be
reasonable in amount, and that the damages, as of the time of
contracting, must be difficult to ascertain upon breach. It is submit-
ted that the intention of the parties test, although frequently dis-
cussed in the older cases, no longer can be considered a vital pre-
requisite.
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES UNDER THE UCC
Section 2-718(1) of the UCC provides:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agree-
ment but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the
" Id., 315 N.E.2d at 459, 358 N.Y.S.2d at 394 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Weather-
proof Improvement Contracting Corp. v. Kramer, 12 Misc. 2d 100, 172 N.Y.S.2d 688 (N.Y.C.
Mun. Ct. Bronx County 1956), plaintiffs initiated suit to recover liquidated damages of $600
for the breach of a contract to repair their home. The agreement executed by the parties had
fixed liquidated damages at 30% of the contract price, while also giving the plaintiffs the
option to sue at law for damages. In dismissing the complaint, the court first stated that
"liquidated damages must be reasonable and not disproportionate to the probable damages
...." Id. at 103, 172 N.Y.S.2d at 691 (emphasis added). However, as part of the rationale,
the court later remarked that it was not satisfied "that there is no great disparity between
the actual damage and the agreed damage." Id. at 105, 172 N.Y.S.2d at 693 (emphasis
added). But see Konner Rental Corp. v. Pedone, 50 Misc. 2d 69, 269 N.Y.S.2d 463 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County 1966), wherein the court observed that the stipulated amount must be en-
forced even if the actual damages are much less than the liquidated sum.
" One commentator has stated: "If a provision specifying a payment by the promisee
upon breach of his covenant is held to be invalid as constituting a penalty, the legal effect is
as though it were expunged from the contract." Dunbar, supra note 42, at 227. See note 7
and accompanying text supra.
" See Perma-Stone Bi-County Corp. v. Ackerman, 15 Misc. 2d 640, 182 N.Y.S.2d 655
(Sup. Ct. Kings County), aff'd mem., 8 App. Div. 2d 731, 187 N.Y.S.2d 991 (2d Dep't 1959);
Weatherproof Improvement Contracting Corp. v. Kramer, 12 Misc. 2d 100, 172 N.Y.S.2d 688
(N.Y.C. Mun. Ct. Bronx County 1956). See generally W. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
CONTRACT § 407, at 514 (5th ed. A. Corbin 1930); G. GRISMORE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 201, at 331-32 (1947); 2 PAGE, supra note 7, § 1170, at 1796; McCormick, supra
note 1, at 117; Liquidated Damages in Illinois Contracts, supra note 8, at 189; 5 CALIF. L.
REV. 75 (1916).
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anticipated or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties
of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of other-
vise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unreasonably
large liquidated damages is void as a penalty. 0
There is substantial disagreement among courts and commen-
tators as to the effect of section 2-718(1) upon pre-Code case law.
One school of thought contends that this section does not alter the
common law on liquidated damages, while the other school suggests
that the Code significantly changes prior law.
Under the former view, section 2-718(1) is considered to be
merely a codification of pre-Code law.71 Proponents of this theory
regard section 2-718(1) as a derivative of section 339 of the first
Restatement of Contracts,72 which provided in pertinent part:
(1) An agreement, made in advance of breach, fixing the dam-
ages therefor, is not enforceable as a contract and does not affect
the damages recoverable for the breach, unless (a) the amount so
fixed is a reasonable forecast of just compensation for the harm
that is caused by the breach, and (b) the harm that is caused by
the breach is one that is incapable or very difficult of accurate
estimation.73
The other school, however, asserts that section 2-718(1) is more
liberal than the pre-Code law7 because of the inclusion of the so-
called "actual harm" test.7 5 Whereas the common law determined
11 N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (McKinney 1964).
7, See, e.g., Pasquale Food Co. v. L & H Int'l Airmotive, Inc., 51 Ala. App. 127, 283 So.
2d 438 (1973); Boyd, Representing Consumers-The Uniform Commercial Code and Beyond.
9 ARiz. L. REv. 372, 379 (1968); Lorensen, The Uniform Commercial Code Sales Article
Compared with West Virginia Law, 64 W. VA. L. REv. 260, 300 (1962); Liquidated Damages
in Illinois Contracts, supra note 8, at 190; Note, Unconscionable Contracts: The Uniform
Commercial Code, 45 IowA L. Rav. 843, 853 (1960).
" See, e.g., Jones, Remedies Under Article 2, 30 Mo. L. REv. 212, 222 (1965), wherein
the author contends that § 2-718(1) is not substantially different from § 339 of the
Restatement of Contracts.
R ESTATEMENT Or CONTRACTS § 339(1)(a), (b) (1932).
, See, e.g., 3A R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, SALES & BuIK TRANSFERs UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 14.08, at 14-63 (1974) [hereinafter cited as DUESENBERG & KINGI.
11 The actual harm test has been termed "an interesting reversal of much pre-Code law
which cut back initially reasonable clauses in the light of hindsight." Peters, Remedies for
Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A
Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199, 278 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Petersl. See
generally 1 N.Y. LAW REvIsIoN COMM'N, REPORT ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 247 (Leg.
Doc. No. 65(C)) (1955) [hereinafter cited as LAW REVISION COMM'NI; Hogan, The Highways
and Some of the Byways in the Sales and Bulk Sales Articles of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 16 (1962); Note, The Uniform Commercial Code: Article 2-Sales.
29 ALB. L. REv. 231, 276 (1965); Comment, The Uniform Commercial Code: Changes in the
New York Law of Damages, 31 FoRDHm L. REv. 749, 763 (1963).
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the validity of a liquidated damages provision solely on the basis of
the anticipated probable harm,7" section 2-718(1) expressly provides
that should the stipulation fail the anticipated harm test, it must
then be assessed in light of the actual damages suffered upon
breach." Thus, "[e]ven if [the] amount was entirely unreason-
able, as of the time of the contract, it can apparently be recovered
so long as it turns out. . . to approximate the harm actually caused
by the . . . breach." ' s
The opposing schools can perhaps be reconciled by noting that
the actual harm test, although a deviation from the strict common
law construction of liquidated damages, simply codifies the afore-
mentioned practice employed by some courts of comparing the stip-
ulated amount with the actual damages suffered.79 Nevertheless, it
is clear that section 2-718(1) sanctions a dual approach for deter-
mining the reasonableness of a liquidated damages provision, in-
structing the court to consider both anticipated and actual harm."°
In addition, the section also dictates that the court must weigh "the
difficulties of proof of loss" and "the inconvenience or nonfeasibility
"' See note 62 and accompanying text supra. But see notes 63 & 64 and accompanying
text supra.
11 See N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (McKinney 1964). The New York Law Revision Commis-
sion expressed difficulty in construing the alternative tests of anticipated and actual harm:
Will either anticipated or actual harm corresponding to the liquidated damages
validate the agreement? Or will a clause which was reasonably related to
anticipated harm be invalidated if it is out of line with the damage which actually
occurred? The proper construction is doubtful, and the Comments shed no light.
Probably the better construction is the first, so that if actual harm is in line with
the stipulated sum, it will not be necessary to speculate concerning the parties'
anticipations.
I LAW REVISION COMM'N, supra note 75, at 247 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
11 Peters, supra note 75, at 278. Dean Hawkland adds that
a stipulation of damages that is reasonably related to the anticipated harm at the
time of the stipulation, is not necessarily invalidated because it fails to forecast
correctly the damages that were actually suffered. Conversely, even if the stipula-
tion of damages does not reasonably reflect a fair judgment of anticipated harm as
of the time of its making, it is validated by events that put it in line with the
damages which actually occur.
Hawkland, Limitation of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 11 How. L.J. 28,
:38-39 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Hawkland].
", See Note, Limitations on Freedom to Modify Contract Remedies, 72 YALE L.J. 723,
751 (1963), in which it is contended that by means of the actual harm test, § 2-718(1)
"recognizes ... what the courts actually do .. " (emphasis added).
See generally Comment, Buyer's Remedies in Sales Cases Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 2 LAND & WATER L. REV. 419, 442-43 (1967). Some courts, though, have failed
to recognize the dual harm tests under § 2-718(1). See, e.g., Mellor v. Budget Advisors, Inc.,
415 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1969); Unit Vending Corp. v. Tobin Enterprises, 194 Pa. Super. 470,
168 A.2d 750 (1961). See notes 89-96 and accompanying text infra.
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of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy."8' Thus, section 2-
718(1) provides a tripartite test to assess the reasonableness of a
stipulation for liquidated damages.12
The "difficulties of proof of loss" test is but a codification of the
common law "difficulily of ascertainment" test. As Dean Hawk-
land notes,
[the difficulties of proof test] always has been recognized as a
principal justification for the use of a liquidated damages clause.
Without this justification, the clause fails of its essential purpose,
and, in this event, there is no reason to utilize it instead of the
normal remedies for damages provided by law.83
Another commentator adds that "[s]ection 2-718 . . . will not pro-
tect the clause unless it approximates injury under circumstances
in which post-breach assessment of damages is difficult."84
The third criterion of reasonableness, "the inconvenience or
nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy," is diffi-
cult to understand. 5 It has been suggested that this test is merely
illustrative of the "difficulties of proof of loss" test. 6 As such, if it
is "clear that an adequate remedy is conveniently and feasibly
available, [an otherwise valid liquidated damages] provision be-
comes an unreasonable one" and is therefore unenforceable.87
The case law applying section 2-718(1) has appropriately been
described as "sparse and inconclusive."s8 In Mellor v. Budget Advi-
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-718(1).
See 1 LAw REVISION COMM'N, supra note 75, at 247. But see 3A DUESENBER. & KING,
supra note 74, § 14.08, at 14-64; Comment, Buyer's Remedies in Sales Cases Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 2 LAND & WATER L. REV. 419, 442 (1967) (tests under § 2-718(1)
are to be construed in the alternative).
The reasonableness of a liquidated damages provision has been held to be a matter of
law to be decided by the court, see Pasquale Food Co. v. L & H Int'l Airmotive, Inc., 51 Ala.
App. 127, 283 So. 2d 438 (1973), although some evidence must be presented on the matter,
see Northwestern Motor Car, Inc. v. Pope, 51 Wis. 2d 292, 187 N.W.2d 200 (1971).
Hawkland, supra note 78, at 39.
" Peters, supra note 75, at 279. But see 1 LAW REVISION COMM'N, supra note 75, at 248
(difficulties with proof of loss test in accord with § 339 of the Restatement of Contracts);
Sweet, supra note 5, at 109, (§ 2-718(1) apparently validates reasonable anticipated damages
even if not difficult to ascertain at trial).
" See 1 LAW REVISION COMM'N, supra note 75, at 248; Peters, supra note 75, at 278-79.
m See Hawkland, supra note 78, at 39. Dean Hawkland adds that "the difficulty and
expense of acquiring or presenting evidence to establish actual damages are matters that
justify the use of a liquidated damages provision." Id. But see Peters, supra note 75, at 278-
79, where it is suggested that the difficulties of proof of loss and the inconvenience tests must
be construed in the alternative to avoid redundancy.
" Hawkland, supra note 78, at 42.
m Speidel & Clay, Seller's Recovery of Overhead Under UCC Section 2-708(2): Economic
Cost Theory and Contract Remedial Policy, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 681, 715 n.97 (1972).
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sors, Inc.," the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered
a liquidated damages provision incorporated within a contract to
purchase shares of stock. In affirming the denial of motions for
summary judgment made by both parties, the court cited section 2-
718(1), and held, inter alia, that an issue of fact existed as to
whether the stipulated sum was reasonable in comparison with the
actual damages.9" The court, however, seemingly ignored the ques-
tion whether the provision was reasonable in light of the anticipated
damages.9'
In Unit Vending Corp. v. Tobin Enterprises,9" a Pennsylvania
court, discussing section 2-718(1),' 3 stated that "[i]f the amount of
damages assessed is subsequently adjudged unreasonable in the
light of either anticipated or actual harm, the contractual provision
will be voided as a penalty . . ... , This interpretation of section
2-718(1) is manifestly incorrect, however, for section 2-718(1) speci-
fically validates a liquidated damages provision if it is reasonable
under either of the harm tests, with no requirement that it be rea-
sonable under both.95
Despite occasional misapplication of this section, the courts,
consistent with the common law, have held that if a liquidated
damages provision is held to be unenforceable, the aggrieved party
may recover whatever actual damages he can prove.9
STIPULATIONS TO PAY ATTORNEY'S FEES
Agreements to pay attorney's fees are most commonly found in
promissory notes, mortgages, and leases.97 Generally, the instru-
ment will provide for a stipulated amount or, if no sum is stated, a
" 415 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1969).
" Id. at 1222.
" Similarly, in Security Safety Corp. v. Kuznicki, 350 Mass. 157, 213 N.E.2d 866 (1966),
a case not involving the sale of goods, the court held that a liquidated damages provision was
void as a penalty because it was disproportionate to the actual damages, and noted that this
rule was consistent with the rule of § 2-718(1). As in Mellor, however, the court appeared to
eschew any inquiry into the anticipated damages.
2 194 Pa. Super. 470, 168 A.2d 750 (1961).
" Unit Vending concerned a contract for the exclusive rights to sell cigarettes from a
vending machine, and thus no "sale" was involved; consequently, the court utilized § 2-718(l)
only by analogy. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-102.
"194 Pa. Super. at 473, 168 A.2d at 751 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
" See notes 77, 78 & 80 and accompanying text supra.
" See, e.g., Mellor v. Budget Advisors, Inc., 415 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1969); Northwestern
Motor Car, Inc. v. Pope, 51 Wis. 2d 292, 187 N.W.2d 200 (1971); Shanker & Abel, Consumer
Protection Under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 29 OHIO ST. L.J. 689,700 (1968).
, See 5 WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 786, at 742. See generally Quint, Attorney s Fees-An
Item of Damage, 41 L.A.B. BULL. 367, 368 (1966).
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reasonable amount to be recovered by the aggrieved party if the
instrument must be placed with an attorney for collection upon
default. 8
In New York, contractual agreements to pay attorney's fees are
generally enforceable." In Commercial Investment Trust, Inc. v.
Eskew, ,0 a New York trial court rejected the contention that inclu-
sion of such provisions in promissory notes are unconscionable and
against public policy,'1' and declared:
Saving the debtor from oppression should not mean relieving him
from the force of his own contract and the effects of his own default
by absolving him from his contractual liability, and transferring
the burden he assumed to the one for whose benefit he engaged to
assume it, unless at least the obligation so to be destroyed is on
its face unjust and oppressive.10
Although not void as against public policy, there is a divergence
of opinion concerning the enforcement of attorney's fees provisions.
Some courts have concluded that "the payment of an attorney's fee
" See 5 WILUSTON, supra note 1, § 786, at 747.
" See, e.g., Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Hollinger, 141 N.Y.S.2d 795 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1955) (agreement to pay counsel fees in promissory note upheld); Rosenthal,
Contractual Provisions for Attorney's Fees, 40 N.Y.S.B.J. 509, 511 (1968) [hereinafter cited
as Rosenthal]. In an overwhelming majority of states, attorney's fees provisions are enforce-
able. For a partial list of those jurisdictions, see note 115 infra.
'I 126 Misc. 114, 212 N.Y.S. 718 (Sup. Ct. Cattaraugus County 1925). In Eskeu, the
plaintiff initiated suit to recover the unpaid balance on a promissory note, together with 15%
of the principal sum as attorney's fees, as provided therein. The agreement specified that this
additional amount was to be recoverable should the plaintiff find it necessary to give the
instrument to an attorney for collection upon default.
o, As to these allegations, the court stated:
That such provision should be held void as against public policy, in that it encour-
ages litigation, I do not believe. It can more consistently be argued that such
provisions would spur the obligors to greater efforts to pay their notes when due, in
order to save such fees; thus encouraging the fulfillment of contracts and lessening
litigation.
As to such provisions oppressing debtors, they apply to and burden no one who
has not contracted therefor.
To vitiate such provision on the ground that it oppresses the debtor is not
warranted by fact.
Id. at 117, 212 N.Y.S. at 721. The notion that attorney's fees provisions are contrary to public
policy has been rejected by the New York courts. See, e.g., 379 Madison Ave., Inc. v. Stuyves-
ant Co., 242 App. Div. 567, 275 N.Y.S. 953 (1st Dep't 1934), aff'd mem., 268 N.Y. 576, 198
N.E. 412 (1935); Weidman v. Tomaselli, 81 Misc. 2d 328, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Rockland County
Ct. 1975). See generally Rosenthal, supra note 99, at 511-13. Similarly, the courts of this state
have also held that a reasonable attorney's fee is not usurious. See, e.g., Franklin Nat'l Bank
v. Bush Homes, Inc., 30 Misc. 2d 473, 219 N.Y.S.2d 280 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1961).
"0 126 Misc. at 117, 212 N.Y.S. at 721. Most courts have insisted, as did the Eskeu' court,
that the sum stipulated must be reasonable in amount. See note 105 and accompanying text
infra.
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• . .is a contractual engagement which the court cannot ignore or
revise," 3 regardless of the services actually rendered by the attor-
ney. ' 4 Most courts, however, have held attorney's fees provisions to
be enforceable for the stipulated amount only "if the amount is
reasonable and bears a fair relationship to the legal services neces-
sarily incurred by reason of a breach. . . .Where, . . . the amount
is arbitrary and excessive, such a provision [has been held to be]
in the nature of a penalty and . . .unenforceable."'0 Under the
former approach, since no question of fact is involved, attorney's
fees may be awarded, as a matter of course, upon a motion for
summary judgment.'"6 Under the latter approach, however, the
court must conduct a factfinding inquiry to ascertain whether the
liquidated amount is reasonable.' 7 This would normally preclude
an award for the stipulated attorney's fees upon a motion for sum-
mary judgment. At times, however, even under this latter approach,
a hearing is dispensed with if the court is satisfied that the stipu-
Im In re Mercantile Dye Works, Inc., 177 Misc. 454, 455, 31 N.Y.S.2d 296, 298 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1941). In In re American Motor Prods. Corp., 98 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1938), a
mortgagee initiated suit to recover, inter alia, 15% of the balance due under the mortgage as
attorney's fees. Pursuant to the agreement between the parties, such fees were to be paid by
the mortgagor should the mortgagee find it necessary to employ an attorney for collection
services upon default. The Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision granting the
15% fees, noting that a court is not free to tamper with the agreement of the parties in the
absence of fraud or usury.
101 See Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Cavell, 206 Misc. 818, 819, 135 N.Y.S.2d 566, 567
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1954), aff'd mem., 2 App. Div. 2d 666, 153 N.Y.S.2d 545 (1st Dep't
1956); accord, Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Capobianco, 51 Misc. 2d 30, 272 N.Y.S.2d 519 (Sup.
Ct. Suffolk County 1966) (20% of face value of promissory note awarded without inquiry into
services performed).
-D Scheible v. Leinen, 67 Misc. 2d 457, 460, 324 N.Y.S.2d 197, 201 (Sup. Ct. Monroe
County 1971) (citations omitted). Accord, 379 Madison Ave., Inc. v. Stuyvesant Co., 242 App.
Div. 567, 275 N.Y.S. 953 (1st Dep't 1934), aff'd mem., 268 N.Y. 576, 198 N.E. 412 (1935)
(attorney's fees held recoverable if reasonable and not a penalty); Weidman v. Tomaselli, 81
Misc. 2d 328, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Rockland County Ct. 1975) (contractual agreement for
attorney's fees enforceable if not a penalty); Jamaica Say. Bank v. Halimi, 76 Misc. 2d 939,
351 N.Y.S.2d 902 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1974) (20% counsel fee held recoverable if
reasonable in amount).
IO See, e.g., Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Hollinger, 141 N.Y.S.2d 795 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1955); Heating & Plumbing Fin. Corp. v. 4274 Third Ave. Corp., 147 Misc. 700, 264
N.Y.S. 505 (N.Y.C. City Ct. N.Y. County 1932). See notes 107 & 165 and accompanying text
infra.
I" See Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Wall St. Commercial Corp., 40 Misc. 2d 1003, 244
N.Y.S.2d 491 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1963), aff'd mem., 21 App. Div. 2d 878, 251 N.Y.S.2d
892 (2d Dep't 1964). See also National Bank of N.A. v. Around the Clock Truck Serv., Inc.,
58 Misc. 2d 660, 296 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1968) (mem.); Franklin Nat'l
Bank v. Feldman, 42 Misc. 2d 839, 249 N.Y.S.2d 181 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1964). For a
discussion of whether a motion for summary judgment could be granted under the holding of
Equitable Lumber, see note 165 infra.
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lated sum is reasonable per se.1°5 For example, in General Lumber
Corp. v. Landa, °9 the plaintiff sued upon a promissory note that
contained a provision obligating the defendant to pay twenty per-
cent of the note as attorney's fees in the event the note was unpaid
at maturity and given to an attorney for collection. The trial court
held such a stipulation to be void as a penalty, unconscionable, and
against public policy. The Appellate Division, Second Department,
disagreed, however, and modified the judgment to allow the twenty
percent sum, holding that "a sum equal to 20% of the face amount
of this note,"10 is a reasonable attorney's fee for its collection by
suit.""' Subsequently, some courts have relied upon General Lum-
ber as authority for the proposition that a twenty percent attorney's
fees stipulation in a note is prima facie reasonable, regardless of the
amount of the principal obligation.12 Normally, however, in deter-
mining the reasonableness of a stipulation for attorney's fees, a
court will consider, inter alia, the attorney's experience, expertise,
and expenditure of time on the matter, including litigation,"' and
the court's own notions of fairness."'
' See, e.g., National Commercial Bank & Trust Co. v. Bart Boat Co., 41 App. Div. 2d
159, 341 N.Y.S.2d 347 (3d Dep't 1973); Jamaica Sav. Bank v. Halimi, 76 Misc. 2d 939, 351
N.Y.S.2d 902 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1974).
' 13 App. Div. 2d 804, 216 N.Y.S.2d 33 (2d Dep't 1961) (mem.).
,,0 The principal sum of the note, with interest, was $2,281.79. Thus, the attorney's fees
requested amounted to only $393.50, or 20% of the face value of the note.
"I Id. at 805, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 34 (emphasis added).
112 See, e.g., Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Bush Homes, Inc., 30 Misc. 2d 473, 219 N.Y.S.2d
280 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1961); Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Bush Prefab. Structures, Inc.,
219 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1961).
,,3 See, e.g., Jamaica Say. Bank v. Halimi, 76 Misc. 2d 939, 351 N.Y.S.2d 902 (N.Y.C.
Civ. Ct. Queens County 1974). In Manufacturers' Fin. Co. v. McKey, 294 U.S. 442 (1935),
the Supreme Court instructed the lower court on remand to consider "all pertinent facts
relating to services rendered by the attorneys" in setting attorney's fees. Id. at 453 (emphasis
added).
"I See, e.g., Airways Supermarkets, Inc. v. Santone, 107 N.Y.S.2d 187 (Sup. Ct. Bronx
County 1951), aff'd mem., 280 App. Div. 924, 116 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1st Dep't 1952). Rosenthal,
supra note 99, at 514, lists the criteria which the courts have used in judging the reasonable-
ness of a stipulation for attorney's fees: "(1) the raw percentage, (2) the amount of the fee
involved, (3) the base on which the percentage is computed and (4) the value of the services
performed." In In re Estate of Potts, 213 App. Div. 59, 209 N.Y.S. 655 (4th Dep't), aff'd mem.,
241 N.Y. 593, 150 N.E. 568 (1925), the court, in an action involving a claim for attorney's
fees accumulated in conjunction with the management of an estate, articulated the applica-
ble criteria for the court to consider when determining the reasonableness of a claim for
counsel fees: "In general, the court ... should consider the time spent, the difficulties
involved in the matters in which the services were rendered, the nature of the services, the
amount involved, the professional standing of the counsel, and the results obtained." 213
App. Div. at 62, 209 N.Y.S. at 657. For a discussion of the criteria used in setting counsel
fees, see Kaufman v. Diversified Indus., Inc., 356 F. Supp. 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Lincoln
Rochester Trust Co. v. Freeman, 34 N.Y.2d 1, 311 N.E.2d 480, 355 N.Y.S.2d 336 (1974); Hahn
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Attorney's Fees: Contract of Indemnity or Liquidated Damages?
Although in most of the United States, as in New York, agree-
ments to pay attorney's fees are enforceable,"' in at least two juris-
dictions attorney's fees are not recoverable except as expressly pro-
vided for by statute."6 Elsewhere, the courts will generally enforce
a stipulation if reasonable in amount."' There is, however, a differ-
ence of opinion among the jurisdictions on the question of whether
an attorney's fees provision is properly considered a contract of
indemnity or an agreement to pay liquidated damages. The vast
majority of courts consider such a stipulation to be one for indemn-
ity."' As was stated by the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
in Webster Drilling Co. v. Walker: '
While a provision in a note or other written obligation for the
payment of attorney's fees is valid in both Oklahoma and Texas,
it is the further rule in both of those states that such a provision
is one of indemnity or reimbursement, not one for liquidated dam-
ages. . . .And the general rule is that a provision of that kind
being one for indemnity . . . as distinguished from one of penalty
for nonpayment, the amount fixed in the instrument is prima facie
the amount recoverable, but it may be reduced by the court in the
exercise of its sound discretion if it is excessive or unreasonable.'2
v. Hahn, 78 Misc. 2d 585, 358 N.Y.S.2d 236 (Fam. Ct. Monroe County 1973), aff'd mem., 44
App. Div. 2d 913, 356 N.Y.S.2d 231 (4th Dep't 1974).
" See, e.g., Montgomery v. Crossthwait, 90 Ala. 553, 8 So. 498 (1890); Kammert Bros.
Enterprises v. Tanque Verde Plaza Co., 102 Ariz. 301, 428 P.2d 678 (1967); Prescott v. Grady,
91 Cal. 518, 27 P. 755 (1891); Ritter's Hotel, Inc. v. Sidebotham, 142 Fla. 171, 194 So. 322
(1940) (per curiam); Porter v. Title Guar. & Sur. Co., 17 Idaho 364, 106 P. 299 (1909); Nat
Harrison Assocs., Inc. v. Gulf States Util. Co., 491 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1974) (applying Louis-
iana law); Cohen v. Fair Lawn Dairies, Inc., 44 N.J. 450, 210 A.2d 73 (1965) (per curiam);
Exchange Bank v. Tuttle, 5 N.M. 427, 23 P. 241 (1890); Pirie v. Conrad, 97 Wis. 150, 72 N.W.
370 (1897); Grand Piano Co. v. Lewis, 179 Va. 281, 19 S.E.2d 86 (1942).
",6 This is the rule in Arkansas and Michigan. See American Exch. Trust Co. v. Truman
Special School Dist., 183 Ark. 1041, 40 S.W.2d 770 (1931); Kittermaster v. Brossard, 105
Mich. 219, 63 N.W. 75 (1895). See also 5 WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 786, at 748 & n.12.
", See 5 WILLISTON, supra note 1, § 786, at 747.
"1 See, e.g., Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Waugh, 78 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1935); Taylor v. Conti-
nental Supply Co., 16 F.2d 578 (8th Cir. 1926); Merchants' Bank v. Thomas, 121 F. 306 (5th
Cir. 1903); Sarasota Pub. Co. v. E.C. Palmer & Co., 102 Fla. 303, 135 So. 521 (1931); Camp-
bell v. Worman, 58 Minn. 561, 60 N.W. 668 (1894); Alcoa Edgewater No. 1 v. Carroll, 44 N.J.
442, 210 A.2d 68 (1965); McClain v. Continental Supply Co., 66 Okla. 225, 168 P. 815 (1917)
(per curiam); Conway v. American Nat'l Bank, 146 Va. 357, 131 S.E. 803 (1926).
Some courts have specifically held that an attorney's fee stipulation is an indemnifica-
tion provision rather than one for liquidated damages. See, e.g., Mechanics' Am. Nat'l Bank
v. Coleman, 204 F. 24 (8th Cir. 1913); Kuper v. Schmidt, 161 Tex. 189, 338 S.W.2d 948 (1960).
286 F.2d 114 (10th Cir. 1961).
flu Id. at 117 (citations omitted).
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Only a few courts have deemed an attorney's fees provision to
be an agreement for liquidated damages.' 21 Even some of these
courts have hedged on such a construction, holding the stipulation
to be only "somewhat in the nature of liquidated damages. 1 2
Louisiana alone has consistently declared such stipulations to be
liquidated damages provisions.s Even in Louisiana, however, this
terminology appears to be merely superficial, for the courts of that
state have not construed attorney's fee provisions in light of the
rules pertaining to liquidated damages. Instead, the Louisiana
courts have enforced these stipulations "in strict accordance with
the terms of the particular provision,' 24 regardless of the services
actually performed.12s In fact, in one case, the Supreme Court of
Louisiana was compelled to remark that whether an attorney's fees
stipulation was considered to be a contract of indemnity or a provi-
sion for liquidated damages was merely "an academic question,
dealing more with the use of words than with the substance of
things.", 21
New York courts impliedly have treated attorney's fees provi-
sions as contracts of indemnity rather than as liquidated damages.'2
Judicial analysis of these stipulations has been singularly concerned
with whether the provision was reasonable in light of the services
rendered by the attorney.'1 Prior to Equitable Lumber, no New
York court had ever applied the tests for liquidated damages to an
agreement to pay attorney's fees.' 29
2I But see Farmers' Nat'I Bank v. Rasmussen, 1 Dak. 60, 46 N.W. 574 (1875); Federated
Mut. Implement & Hardware Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 53 Tenn. App. 288, 382 S.W.2d 214 (1964).
'2 American Freehold Land Mortg. Co. v. Whaley, 63 F. 743, 749 (D.S.C. 1894), aff'd,
74 F. 73 (4th Cir. 1896). Accord, Snider v. Bozarth, 180 So. 2d 800 (La. App. 1965).
12 See Lagarde Fin. Co. v. Vinet, 346 F.2d 846, 850 (5th Cir. 1965) (applying Louisiana
law).
121 Id. at 850.
"1 See W.K. Henderson Iron Works & Supply Co. v. Meriwether Supply Co., 178 La.
516, 152 So. 69 (1934).
Im Foundation Fin. Co. v. Robbins, 179 La. 259, 270, 153 So. 833, 837 (1934). For a
discussion of attorney's fees in Louisiana, see Comment, Attorney's Fees as an Element of
Damages in Louisiana, 34 TUL. L. Ray. 146 (1959).
"2 In Waxman v. Williamson, 256 N.Y. 117, 120, 123, 175 N.E. 534, 535-36 (1931), the
court of appeals considered whether a provision for attorney's fees contained in a promissory
note was "a debt or liquidated demand," and held that it was the former. See also Bank of
N.Y. v. Clavier Corp., 29 App. Div. 2d 927, 289 N.Y.S.2d 125 (1st Dep't 1968) (mem.).
121 See Jamaica Say. Bank v. Halimi, 76 Misc. 2d 939, 351 N.Y.S.2d 902 (N.Y.C. Civ.
Ct. Queens County 1974); Scheible v. Leinen, 67 Misc. 2d 457, 324 N.Y.S.2d 197 (Sup. Ct.
Monroe County 1971); note 106 and accompanying text supra.
'2 But see Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Outerbridge, 42 Misc. 2d 756, 249 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sup.
Ct. Kings County 1963). There, the court held that a provision for attorney's fees in an
employment contract was not a penalty, but rather a stipulation for liquidated damages. The
court did not, however, construe the provision in light of the tests for liquidated damages.
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ANALYSIS OF THE Equitable Lumber DECISION
In Equitable Lumber, the lower court had ruled that the thirty
percent attorney's fees stipulation was unreasonable in comparison
to the court's estimate of the time and effort necessary for an attor-
ney to handle the plaintiff's claim.10 Judge Gabrielli, writing for the
New York Court of Appeals, determined that this approach was
incorrect, stating:
Analysis of the harm suffered by the injured party is the focal point
of section 2-718(1). . . . Under both the "actual" and "antici-
pated" harm tests, the time expended by the attorney in obtaining
collection is not necessarily the correct measure of damages, since
an attorney would be expected to bill his client on a contingent fee
basis. '3
The court applied the dual harm tests of section 2-718(1), not-
ing that the anticipated harm test would be satisfied if the stipu-
lated amount was "related to the normal contingent fee charged by
attorneys in the collection context,' ' 32 and that the actual harm test
would be satisfied if the plaintiff had, in fact, agreed upon a thirty
percent contingent fee arrangement with its attorney.'33 In a passage
of critical importance, the court also indicated that even if a stipula-
tion is reasonable in view of the actual harm suffered, it could still
fail under the second sentence of section 2-718(1) if it is "so unrea-
sonably large as to be void as a penalty.' ' 3
The case was then remanded to the trial court to resolve the
following issues:
(1) was a 30% fee reasonable in light of the damages to be antici-
pated by one in the plaintiff's position, that is, was the fee reason-
ably related to the normal fee an attorney would charge for the
collection of plaintiff's claim; or, alternatively, (2) was the fee
commensurate with the actual arrangement agreed upon by the
plaintiff and its attorney? Even if the 30% fee did correspond to
the actual arrangement between plaintiff and its attorney, the
court on remand should determine whether the amount stipulated
was unreasonably large or grossly disproportionate to the damages
"' 38 N.Y.2d at 523, 344 N.E.2d at 397, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 464.
'3, Id. at 524, 344 N.E.2d at 397, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 464-65.
,' Id., 344 N.E.2d at 397, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 465.
13 Id.
"I Id. Judge Gabrielli noted: "If plaintiff entered into an exorbitant fee arrangement
with counsel, knowing that defendant would suffer the consequences, then the liquidated
damages provision would be void as a 'term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages.'"
Id. See N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-718(1) (McKinney 1964).
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which the plaintiff was likely to suffer from breach in the event it
did not rely on respondent's agreement to pay its attorney's fees.
If the amount is found to be unreasonably large, then the provision
is void as a penalty. 31
In so construing section 2-718(1), one of the court's avowed
purposes was to waylay the threat of collusion between the plaintiff
and his attorney. As Judge Gabrielli stated, "[w]hile plaintiff may
enter into any fee arrangement it wishes with counsel, it should not
be permitted to manipulate the actual damage incurred by burden-
ing the defendant with an exorbitant fee arrangement."'36 Unfortu-
nately, the solution to this problem offered by the court appears to
raise more questions than it resolves.
Equitable Lumber: The "Anticipated Harm" Test
Under the anticipated harm test, the court directed the judicial
inquiry to focus upon ascertaining the "normal fee" charged by an
attorney for handling the plaintiff's claim. 137 The court indicated
that "since an attorney would be expected to bill his client on a
contingent fee basis, ' 138 the anticipated harm can be established by
determining the average contingent fee charged for a collection mat-
ter. It is suggested that it would be unfortunate if the inquiry into
the anticipated harm is limited to a search for a "typical" contin-
gent fee. While this method arguably might assess a plaintiffs an-
ticipated harm if he has actually negotiated for his attorney's ser-
vices on a contingent fee basis, or if he has not established method
of payment for his attorney's services, quaere, whether this method
is applicable if the parties have entered into a different fee arrange-
ment? For example, if a plaintiff has agreed to compensate his
attorney on an hourly basis, the average contingent fee percentage
charged for handling this matter would be irrelevant in establishing
the plaintiff's anticipated harm. Similarly, if the attorney is on
retainer, the typical contingent fee charged for a collection would
not be germane to establishing the plaintiff's anticipated harm for
this particular transaction.
On the other hand, what if the court should determine that a
collection matter typically is not handled on a contingent fee
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basis?'39 For example, suppose the plaintiff, about to enter into a
contract with the defendant, hired a prestigious law firm to repre-
sent him in the negotiations. The plaintiff's firm, as a matter of
course, charges higher fees than the average law firm. The plaintiff
and his attorney,. without collusion, agreed that the firm would
charge the plaintiff $1500 if collection was necessary. The plaintiff
communicated this fee arrangement to the defendant, and the par-
ties agreed to include this sum in their contract as the amount the
defendant would pay should he subsequently breach the contract,
and thus force the plaintiff to hand the matter over to his attorney
for collection. If upon breach, and after the attorney had rendered
his services, the court determined that the normal fee to be antici-
pated for this type of matter is $500, the contract stipulation might
fail the anticipated harm test under Equitable Lumber despite the
fact that it was entered into without collusion between the plaintiff
and his attorney, and despite the fact that this was, in actuality,
the harm anticipated by the parties when they entered into the
contract. 40
In effect, the court's interpretation of the anticipated harm test
shifts the focus of judicial inquiry from the contract negotiated by
the parties, with all its attendant circumstances and exigencies, to
an objective standard of reasonableness wholly foreign to their
agreement.'4 ' While this may succeed in preventing collusive fee
arrangements, it will also invalidate many noncollusive agreements
which, although reasonable in themselves, are deemed unreasonable
in comparison to this external standard."'
,' Such a finding is unlikely, however, for collection work is generally handled on a
contingent fee basis. See Schiff, Should a Commercial Attorney Accept Retail Collections-A
Critical Analysis, 78 CoM. L.J. 50 (1973).
" See text accompanying note 137 supra. It should be noted that under Equitable
Lumber, when confronted with such a situation, the court would go on to assess the validity
of the stipulation under the actual harm test.
"I In its directions to the lower court on remand, the court of appeals instructed that
court to determine whether a 30% fee was "reasonable in light of the damages to be antici-
pated by one in the plaintiff's position . . ." 38 N.Y.2d at 524, 344 N.E.2d at 397, 381
N.Y.S.2d at 465. If this were the extent of the instruction, then the hypothetical situation
discussed in the text above would pose no problem under the court's interpretation of the
anticipated harm test. The remainder of the sentence, however, appears to limit this instruc-
tion by restricting the judicial inquiry to an examination of whether the 30% fee was "reasona-
bly related to the normal fee an attorney would charge for the collection of plaintiff's claim
.... " Id. Such a limitation would present only a single criterion for the court to consider
when assessing the reasonableness of a liquidated damages provision. As such, the validity
of a stipulation would hinge on its relationship to a factor extraneous to the contract.
" The court's application of an independent standard as the single determinant of
reasonableness under its interpretation of § 2-718(1) might be in conflict with the official
[Vol. 51:100
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Equitable Lumber: The "Actual Harm" Test
The court's interpretation of the actual harm test"' presents
similar difficulties. It is clear from the opinion that if the plaintiff
and his attorney had actually agreed to a thirty percent contingent
fee, then the plaintiff's actual harm would be in accord with the
liquidated damages stipulation.'44 Yet, the court indicates that such
a provision might still fail pursuant to the second sentence of section
2-718(1) if it was "so unreasonably large as to be void as a pen-
alty."'45 This construction is a radical departure from prior interpre-
tation of the actual harm test, which would focus only upon ascer-
taining the actual damages suffered.'" If the liquidated damages
stipulation was reasonably related to this actual damage, even if
wholly by accident, the inquiry would end, and the provision would
be enforced.'47 Under the actual harm test as interpreted in
Equitable Lumber, however, even if the plaintiff, without collusion,
actually suffered damages equal to the stipulated amount, the court
could refuse to enforce the provision if it found the stipulation dis-
proportionate to some objective yardstick of reasonableness foreign
to the contract.18 Thus, the court has again tied the viability of a
commentary under that section, which states in pertinent part: "Under subsection (1) liqui-
dated damage clauses are allowed where the amount involved is reasonable in the light of
the circumstances of the case." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-718(1), Comment 1 (emphasis
added).
1,3 See text accompanying notes 134-35 supra.
" 38 N.Y.2d at 524, 344 N.E.2d at 397, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 465.
"4 Id.
"' See, e.g., Security Safety Corp. v. Kuznicki, 350 Mass. 157, 213 N.E.2d 866 (1966);
Denkin v. Sterner, 10 Pa. D. & C.2d 203 (1956), discussed in 105 U. PA. L. REV. 764 (1957).
1, See Peters, supra note 75, at 278; Comment, The Uniform Commercial Code: Changes
in the New York Law of Damages, 31 FoRDHm L. REv. 749, 763 (1963).
"I The court of appeals failed to indicate, however, whether a stipulation which is unrea-
sonably small in relation to the normal contingent fee charged for collections would likewise
be considered unenforceable under the court's interpretation of § 2-718(1). The official com-
mentary to this section states in pertinent part: "A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated
damages is expressly made void as a penalty. An unreasonably small amount would be
subject to similar criticism and might be stricken under the section on unconscionable con-
tracts or clauses." UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-718, Comment 1 (emphasis added). One
commentator suggests that an unreasonably small sum would be considered void as a penalty.
See 3A DUESENBERG & KING, supra note 74, § 14.08, at 14-64. See generally Fritz,
"Underliquidated" Damages as Limitation of Liability, 33 TEx. L. REv. 196 (1954); Ganz,
Limitation of Liability Under the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 14 DE
PAUL L. REv. 73, 80 (1964), which adopt the position that unreasonably small sums would be
unenforceable as unconscionable.
Judge Gabrielli indicated that the section of the UCC dealing with unconscionability,
§ 2-302, is inapplicable to the case at bar since here the parties were "commercial entities
dealing at arm's length with relative equality of bargaining power. . . .Defendant IPA,
therefore, cannot assume the posture of a commercially illiterate consumer beguiled into a
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
liquidated damages provision to a contingency wholly outside the
agreement negotiated by the parties.'
Damages Recoverable if the Provision is Unenforceable
In its discussion of liquidated damages, the court failed to an-
swer an important question, namely, what damages may the plain-
tiff recover should the court hold the stipulation to be unenforceable
under both harm tests. It is settled law that if a liquidated damages
provision is held to be unenforceable, the plaintiff may recover any
actual damages which he can prove.'50 Applying this rule in
Equitable Lumber, however, might yield absurd results. For exam-
ple, even if a stipulation failed the actual harm test as being dispro-
portionate to the "normal fee" charged in that context, would the
plaintiff still be able to recover the stipulated amount, since it
would be equal to his actual damages?
May An Attorney's Fees Provision Properly Be Considered a
Stipulation For Liquidated Damages?
Undoubtedly, the most significant statement made by the court
was its summary characterization of the clause at issue in Equitable
Lumber as an agreement for liquidated damages.' 5 ' The rationale
offered for this construction was that "[a]t the time of contracting
the attorney's fees were arguably incapable of estimation. ",152 As
previously discussed, however, the estimation test has been rejected
by the New York courts in favor of the difficulty of ascertainment
test. 5 3 Under this latter standard, the court's characterization of an
grossly unfair bargain by a deceptive vendor or finance company." 38 N.Y.2d at 523, 344
N.E.2d at 396, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 464. For an example of a situation involving unconsciona-
bility, see Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1969).
Judge Gabrielli did not deny the relevancy of § 2-302 in appropriate circumstances,
however, since "[in the proper case a provision that one party to a contract pay the other
party's attorney's fees in the event of breach may be unconscionable." 38 N.Y.2d at 523, 344
N.E.2d at 396, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 464. See N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-302 (McKinney 1964). For discussion
of this section and the subject of unconscionability under the Code, see Asch,
"Unconscionable" Sales Contracts in New York, 17 ADVOCATE 65 (1970); Leff,
Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1967);
Note, Unconscionable Contracts: The Uniform Commercial Code, 45 IOWA L. REV. 843 (1960);
Note, Unconscionable Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 109 U. PA. L. REV.
401 (1960).
"' See notes 141-42 and accompanying text supra.
'so See note 96 and accompanying text supra.
'5' 38 N.Y.2d at 523, 344 N.E.2d at 396, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 464.
152 Id., 344 N.E.2d at 396-97, 381 N.Y.S.2d at 464 (emphasis added).
'' See note 57 and accompanying text supra. The New York Annotations to § 2-718 state,
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attorney's fees stipulation as a liquidated damages provision may
seriously be questioned, since attorney's fees do not appear to be
difficult to ascertain. 154
To be a valid liquidated damages clause under both the com-
mon law and the Code, the damages which result upon breach must
be difficult to establish. 5 If the actual harm is relatively easy to
determine, there is no necessity for the parties to agree in advance
on damages. 5" While attorney's fees may be a matter of conjecture
at the time the parties enter into the contract, they clearly are
ascertainable at trial once the attorney's services have been ren-
dered. As such, an attempt to liquidate attorney's fees could be
considered void ab initio.'57 Nevertheless, in Equitable Lumber, the
New York Court of Appeals characterized an attorney's fees provi-
sion as a stipulation for liquidated damages.' The import of the
decision lies in the consequences of this characterization.
however, that "the tests here proposed [under § 2-718(1)] are similar to those set forth in
Restatement, Contracts § 339 and New York Annotations." N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-718, N.Y. Anno-
tations (McKinney 1964). The Restatement supports the estimation test. See RESTATEMENT
OF CONTRACTS § 339(1)(b) (1932), quoted in text accompanying note 73 supra.
"I Professor Sweet states that legal services, being relatively easy to value, are probably
not able to be liquidated. Sweet, supra note 5, at 111.
See notes 44-51, 83 & 84 and accompanying text supra.
' ' Professor Sweet notes that
in cases where liquidation has not been permitted, while proof of the amount of
damages is not always clear cut-attorneys may differ in valuing legal services...
valuing the actual damages is not beyond the skill and expertise of a court; there-
fore, the need for contract-specified amounts is not as pressing . . . . Courts are
likely to validate clauses where the actual damages are difficult to measure even
at the time of trial and are unlikely to validate clauses where the measures of
recovery for actual damages are relatively simple to work with and can produce a
reasonably rational solution.
Sweet, supra note 5, at 135 (emphasis added).
"I In Eastman v. Sunset Park Land, 35 Cal. App. 628, 170 P. 642 (2d Dist. 1917), the
court considered whether an attorney's fee provision in a promissory note would render the
note nonnegotiable. In holding that such a stipulation did not impugn the instrument's
negotiability, the court remarked that there would be no difficulty in assessing the actual
damages suffered upon breach, and, therefore, an agreement attempting to fix such damage
in advance would be unenforceable.
" At times, courts have been confronted with a stipulation for liquidated damages and
an attorney's fee provision contained within the same contract. In such situations, the courts
have construed these clauses under different analyses. Thus, in Fairfield Lease Corp. v. Marsi
Dress Corp., 60 Misc. 2d 363, 303 N.Y.S.2d 179 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1969), the
plaintiff's assignor and the defendants entered into an agreement in which the defendants
covenanted to rent a machine from the plaintiff's assignor on a monthly basis. The contract
provided, inter alia, that upon any default, the lessor could accelerate all future rents due
thereunder, and recover an additional 20% as attorney's fees if counsel had to be retained to
handle the matter. The court first examined the acceleration clause in light of the tests for
liquidated damages, concluding that the provision was an unenforceable penalty. When
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Agreements to pay attorney's fees are included, almost as a
matter of course, in most promissory notes, mortgages, leases, and
other contracts.' 59 In construing such stipulations in the past, New
York courts have generally sought to determine whether the provi-
sion was reasonable in light of the legal services rendered.,"6
Under Equitable Lumber, this analysis has been rendered sus-
pect. 6 ' In an attempt to prevent collusive fee arrangements,6 2 the
considering the agreement to pay attorney's fees, however, the court utilized a different
approach, stating:
A contract may provide for the payment of attorney's fees by a defaulting party,
but those fees are recoverable solely as a contract right and not as damages.
However, the stipulated fee must bear a reasonable relationship to the legal
services necessarily incurred by reason of the breach of contract. A provision for the
payment of an arbitrary amount as an attorney's fee would be in the nature of a
penalty and therefore unenforceable.
Id. at 366, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 182 (citations omitted).
Similarly, in Carol Management Co. v. Baring Indus., 257 So. 2d 270 (Fla. App. 1972)
(per curiam), the buyer sued the seller for breach of a sales contract. The contract provided,
inter alia, that if the buyer canceled the agreement, any monies already paid as a downpay-
ment would be forfeited to the seller as liquidated damages. Another provision stated that
the buyer would pay the seller's reasonable attorney's fees if the contract had to be turned
over to an attorney for enforcement. Like the court in Fairfield Lease, the Carol Management
court applied the liquidated damages tests in construing the first provision, while applying a
different test in its analysis of the attorney's fee stipulation.
Similarly, the contract involved in Equitable Lumber specifically included a liquidated
damages provision in addition to the stipulation for attorney's fees. This clause stated:
If the Buyer should breach this contract, or where Seller has a right to terminate
this contract, in addition to any other rights, remedies or causes of action provided
by law or by this contract, the Seller shall be entitled to the profits it would have
earned had the Buyer performed. The Buyer and Seller agree that in such event
the Buyer shall pay to the Seller as liquidated damages ten (10%) per cent of the
contract price on the material remaining undelivered and the parties agree that
same represents a fair figure for such unliquidated damages, and that the exact
damages and profits the Seller would earn are impossible and difficult to determine.
Brief for Appellant at A-20 (emphasis added).
,s See note 97 and accompanying text supra.
'e' See notes 105, 113 & 114 and accompanying text supra. In a deposition given by the
plaintiff's attorney in Equitable Lumber, counsel noted the services he had rendered in his
client's behalf, including: (1) an investigation was conducted into his client's rights under
the Lien Law; (2) counsel visited the site where defendant was going to use the materials
purchased in order to prepare a plot plan; (3) a title search was made of the property; (4) a
mechanic's lien was prepared; (5) the complaint served upon the defendant was prepared;
(6) legal research into the issues raised in litigation was conducted; and (7) the judgment
would have to be collected, which might include future litigation. Brief for Appellant at A-
27 to -28.
' See notes 130 & 131 and accompanying text supra.
W2 hile the court of appeals was attempting to prevent collusion between the plaintiff
and its attorney, it is interesting to note that the plaintiff in Equitable Lumber had agreed
to pay its attorney a fee in excess of 30%. Brief for Appellant at A-28.
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court of appeals has tied the enforcement of a stipulation for attor-
ney's fees to a standard independent of the contract. Although the
decision, strictly speaking, is applicable only to contracts for the
sale of goods, its rationale appears to extend beyond this context.1 3
Since the court unequivocably and without reservation character-
ized the clause in issue as a liquidated damages provision, it is only
logical to assume that the rationale of Equitable Lumber extends
to similar clauses found in leases, mortgages, promissory notes, and
other legal instruments.
Although the court, in the instant case, scrutinized only attor-
ney's fees, the analysis of section 2-718(1) offered would appear
applicable to any other kind of damages which the parties might
desire to liquidate. As such, parties run the risk that the validity of
their stipulation may be tied to an external standard-one not con-
templated by the parties when they negotiated the provision.
In addition, Equitable Lumber appears contrary to the raison
d'ktre of liquidated damages, namely, judicial economy. The es-
sence of the law of liquidated damages is the judicial recognition
that
the award of a court or jury is no more likely to be exact compensa-
tion than is the advance estimate of the parties themselves ....
[The enforcement of such estimates saves the time of courts,
juries, parties, and witnesses, and reduces the expense of litiga-
tion. 64
In going beyond the agreement of the parties, Equitable
Lumber has broadened the court's role in assessing a liquidated
damages stipulation, while diminishing the economy and value of
such a provision. In the wake of this decision, it is highly unlikely
that a court could enforce an attorney's fees provision, or any kind
of liquidated damages stipulation, without first conducting a fact-
finding inquiry, thus precluding adjudication upon a motion for
summary judgment.'65
Ws At least one court has extended the applicability of Equitable Lumber beyond the
scope of article 2. See Truck Rent-A-Center, Inc. v. Puritan Farms, 2nd Inc., 51 App. Div.
2d 786, 789 n.2, 380 N.Y.S.2d 37, 42 n.2 (2d Dep't 1976) (mei.), where Justice Shapiro,
writing for the dissent, cited Equitable Lumber as a general authority on the law of liquidated
damages in a case involving an action for breach of a lease.
11' 5 CORHIN, supra note 2, § 1060, at 348 (footnote omitted). Dean Hawkland adds that
"the hazard of being exposed to the vagaries of a jury passing on the amount of damages" is
a primary reason for utilizing a liquidated damages provision. Hawkland, supra note 78, at
39. See generally Sweet, supra note 5, at 86-87.
"1 Under Equitable Lumber, it is difficult to envision how attorney's fees may ever be
awarded upon a motion for summary judgment, since the court must now inquire beyond the
actual contract to determine the reasonableness of a stipulation. Clearly, an investigation of
19761
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The court of appeals must elucidate its decision before the full
implications of Equitable Lumber are understood. It must clearly
define the limits of the decision, and the extent of its applicability
in a nonsales context. Until then, the import of Equitable Lumber
is at best a matter of conjecture.
Robert M. Miller
this nature will require a hearing to be conducted in every case. This undermines the reason
for the parties to negotiate such a provision, which is to obviate the necessity of litigating
the issue. Telephone interview with Max Omstein, Attorney for the Appellant, Feb. 3, 1976.
